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it is entirely possible that the major companies will seek to integrate
into retail marketing."3 It is interesting to note the divergent views
taken on this problem by the court of appeals and Supreme Court
in the Sun Oil case. The court of appeals stated, "[T]he natural
effect of the Commission's holding [affirmed by the Supreme Court]
will be to push already highly-integrated majors into combining
direct retailing with their other operations. . .. " The Supreme
Court, on the other hand, dismissed the problem with the curt
statement: "[W]e see no evidence that such forward integration is
inevitable or required as the only feasible alternative. It has not yet
occurred and suppliers ... have discerned sound and apparently per-
suasive reasons for heretofore rejecting direct ownership and opera-
tion of their stations; it is wholly reasonable to believe that such
incentives persist."'
John R. Johnson
Constitutional Power of State to Develop Its Own
Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine
A New York citizen was killed when the defendant's airliner
bound from New York crashed in Massachusetts. The decedent's
administratrix sued the airline, a Massachusetts corporation, in a
New York federal district court' on a cause of action for wrongful
death created by a Massachusetts statute.' The trial court granted
recovery,' but refused to apply the maximum recovery limitation and
" "Some companies, including Sun, have indicated that if the good-faith defense is
closed to them in situations similar to that Sun faced in Jacksonville . . . they would
seriously consider changing marketing patterns. Such changes might involve a switch to
operation of their own stations .... " Oil & Gas Journal, Jan. 21, 1963, p. 39.
"
4 Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 465, 478 (5th Cir. 1961). See Notes approving this
decision, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 429 (1961); 1962 Duke L.J. 300; 47 Va. L. Rev. 1229
(1961); 62 Col. L. Rev. 171 (1962).
" 371 U.S. at 528-29.
, Jurisdiction was based upon the parties' diverse citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
If the administrator suing on a statutory cause of action for wrongful death is the
real party in interest, his citizenship ordinarily will determine whether diversity exists.
Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n.1 (1957); Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co.,
284 U.S. 183 (1931). In the instant case, both the administratrix and the decedent were
citizens of New York.
"'If the proprietor of a common carrier of passengers . . . causes the death of a
passenger, he . . . shall be liable in damages in the sum of not less than two thousand
nor more than fifteen thousand dollars, to be assessed with reference to the degree of
culpability of the defendant or of his . . . servants or agents. ... Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 229, § 2 (1955). While the appeal in the instant case was pending, the Massachusetts
statute was amended to raise the maximum recovery allowed thereunder to $30,000.
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 229, S 2 (Supp. 1962).
' Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
1963 ] NOTES
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17
the punitive standard for the measure of damages contained in the
Massachusetts statute because those provisions were contrary to the
public policy of New York." The court of appeals reversed,' holding
that the refusal to apply the limitation provision and the punitive
standard constituted a violation of the full faith and credit clause.'
On rehearing en banc, Held, reversed: A state, in properly exercising
its power to develop its conflict-of-laws doctrine, constitutionally
may apply a foreign state's wrongful death statute without honor-
ing the limitation on recovery and the standard for the measure of
damages contained therein.' Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309
F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
In a technical sense, "it is impossible for a court to enforce any
liability [i.e., a cause of action generally] except one created by the
law of the state in which it sits."' Therefore, a cause of action arising
under the law of a foreign jurisdiction is enforceable in the forum
only if that claim can be assimilated into the corpus of the law of
'Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). "The right
of action now existing to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall never be
abrogated; and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation."
N.Y. Const. art. I, § 16. For a discussion of the purpose of this provision, see Kilberg
v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 527-28 (1961) and Medinger
v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 6 App. Div. 42, 46, 39 N.Y.S. 613, 616 (Sup. Ct. 1896).
' Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962).
'Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof." U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. Congress has enacted an implementing
statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958).
7However, the court of appeals en banc affirmed the unanimous determination by
the panel that the addition of prejudgment interest was to be controlled by Massachusetts
law. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 1962). The Massachu-
setts wrongful death statute provides that interest shall accumulate from "the date of the
writ." Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 229, § 11 (1955). But, the New York wrongful death
act provides for the computation of interest from the date of the decedent's death. N.Y.
Deced. Est. Law § 132 (1949). On the basis of the reasoning of the New York Court of
Appeals in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961),
see note 31 infra, the trial court concluded that prejudgment interest was to be awarded
in accordance with the law of New York; it accordingly denied defendant's motion to
strike out such interest. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y.
1961). Thereafter, but prior to the appeal in the instant case, the New York supreme
court held that the lex loci delicti governs the running of prejudgment interest in a
wrongful death action based upon a foreign statute; prejudgment interest was characterized
as a part of the damages which, under the New York conflict-of-laws rule, are determined
by the lex loci delicti. Davenport v. Webb, 15 App. Div. 2d 42, 222 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Sup.
Ct. 1961), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902 (1962). The Kilberg decision, supra,
was distinguished on the narrow ground that it merely expressed New York's strong
public policy "with respect to limitations in wrongful death actions." Id. at 904. (Emphasis
added.)
' Siegmann v. Meyer, 100 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1938). See Cavers, The Two "Local Law"
Theories, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 822 (1950).
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the forum through the application of its conflict-of-laws rule.'
Generally, in a tort action, the procedural law of the forum" and
the substantive law of the place of injury, or lex loci delicti,11 govern
the cause of action. However, if the lex loci delicti contravenes the
authoritatively declared public policy of the forum, the forum con-
stitutionally may refuse to entertain the suit"' or may apply its own
substantive law to adjudicate the claim.13 Similarly, a civil claim of
a penal nature which arises under the law of a foreign jurisdiction
is not enforceable in the forum." In any situation, a federal court
exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply the substantive law of
' Siegmann v. Meyer, supra note 8, at 368; Guinness v. Miller, 291 Fed. 769 (S.D.N.Y.
1923), aff'd, 299 Fed. 538 (2d Cir. 1924), aff'd sub noma., Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S.
71 (1925); Restatement, Conflict of Laws 5 7 (1934).
50Goodrich, Conflict of Laws §§ 80-81 (3d ed. 1949); Leflar, Conflict of Laws 5§
60-61, 118 (1959); Restatement, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 585; Stumberg, Conflict of
Laws 134-68 (2d ed. 1951).
" Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 10, at §§ 93-94; Leflar, op. cii. supra note 10, at 5
110, 113-14; Restatement, op. cit. supra note 9, at §§ 377-79, 384, 391; Stumberg,
Op. cit. supra note 10, at 182-87. Texas is one of the jurisdictions in which this rule has
been enacted by statute. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4678 (1952). For a discussion
of the Texas statute, see Jones v. Louisiana W. Ry., 243 S.W. 976 (Tex. Comm. App.
1922).
"2Hudson v. Von Hamm, 85 Cal. App. 323, 259 Pac. 374 (D. Ct. App. 1927)
(liability of parent for tort of minor child); Jacobsen v. Saner, 247 Iowa 191, 72 N.W.2d
900 (1955) (alienation of affections suit by divorced spouse); Mertz v. Mertz, 271
N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936) (interspousal tort action); Continental Supply Co. v.
Syndicate Trust Co., 52 N.D. 209, 202 N.W. 404 (1924) (contract stipulating for
attorney's fees); El Paso & Juarez Traction Co. v. Carruth, 255 S.W. 159 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1923) (tort law of foreign jurisdiction substantially different from that of forum).
See Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 10, at 5 97; Leflar, op. cit. supra note 10, at § 48;
Restatement, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 612; Stumberg, op. cit. supra note 10, at 198-99.
As to the unenforceability in Texas of a contract made in another state by a married
woman domiciled in Texas, see Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412 (1918) and
Bramwell v. Conquest, 2 S.W.2d 995 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). But the forum constitutionally
cannot dismiss a foreign cause of action if there is in fact no genuine antagonism between
the lex loci delicti or lex loci contractu and the public policy of the forum. First Nat'l
Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609
(1951). See Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 Colum. L.
Rev. 969, 972-80 (1956).
"3Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201 (1941); Griffin v. McCoach,
313 U.S. 498 (1941); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 306 U.S.
493 (1939); Gray v. Blight, 112 F.2d 696 (10th Cir. 1940); Grant v. McAuliffe, 41
Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130,
95 N.W.2d 814 (1959). See Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 12, at 992-94; Goodrich,
op. cit. supra note 10, at § 97; Leflar, op. cii. supra note 10, at § 48; Restatement, op. cit.
supra note 9, at 5 612; Stumberg, op. cit. supra note 10, at 198-99. See also King v. Bruce,
145 Tex. 647, 201 S.W.2d 803, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 769, rehearing denied, 332 U.S. 820
(1947) and Taylor v. Leonard, 275 S.W. 134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) (application of
forum's community property law to contracts entered into elsewhere by spouses domiciled
in forum). As to Texas marital rights and the conflict of laws, see generally 1-2 Speer,
Marital Rights in Texas § 35, 50, 100, 298, 535, 613, 751 (4th ed. 1961).
4 See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892); Osborn v. Borchetta, 20 Conn. Sup.
163, 129 A.2d 238 (Super. Ct. 1956); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120
N.E. 198 (1918); Clay v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 228 S.W. 907 (Tex. Comm. App.
1921). See Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 10, at § 97; Leflar, op. cit. supra note 10, at 5 49;
Restatement, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 611; Stumberg, op. cit. supra note 10, at 172-74.
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the state in which it is sitting,' including that state's conflict-of-
laws rule.1"
The application of the lex loci delicti in its entirety or else not at
all is not an iron rule of constitutional law, even though most courts
have analyzed and resolved their respective conflict-of-laws problems
in accordance with the Restatement." The full faith and credit
clause does not require in every instance the literal and complete
application of the foreign substantive law after its recognition by the
forum as the source of the claim. Generally, therefore, a state having
substantial connections with a cause of action thereby acquires such
a sufficient interest therein that it constitutionally may disregard, in
whole or in part, the lex loci delicti5 and may apply its own sub-
stantive law in adjudicating the claim."' Thus, it has been held that
a cause of action arising under the lex loci delicti may be qualified
or limited by statutory defenses of the forum."0 Similarly, the forum
may impose reasonable conditions upon the enforcement of a con-
tract entered into or to be performed elsewhere. 1
Prior to the instant case, the New York Court of Appeals had
concluded in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,"2 which arose out
of the same airplane crash as did the instant case, that the adminis-
" Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938).
" Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
17 See notes 10-14 supra and accompanying text.
1 But probably not in matters of fraternal society insurance. See Order of United
Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947), holding that the law of the
domicile of the fraternal society is controlling. See Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication
versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 Stan. L. Rev. 205, 238 (1958); Currie,
The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function,
26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 9, 52 (1958).
"9Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1955); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); see also Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15
(1962). But if the interest asserted by the forum is in fact nonexistent and there are
no substantial connections with the cause of action, the forum's dismissal of the claim
or application of its own law to the adjudication thereof constitutes a violation of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397
(1930), New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914)) and/or the full faith
and credit clause. First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952),
Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
"5 Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953); Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime
Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955).
" Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); see McDowell v.
National Sur. Corp., 68 So. 2d 189, 193 (La. Ct. App. 1953), appeal denied, 347 U.S.
995 (1954); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941). There is much confusion in the
conflict of laws as to what law determines the validity of a contract. See Goodrich,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 5 110; Leflar, op. cit. supra note 10, at § 123, 125; Restate-
ment, op. cit. supra note 9, at 5§ 332, 358; Stumberg, op. cit. supra note 10, at 225-40.
But a significantly different approach has been advocated recently. See Restatement (Second),
Conflict of Laws § 332 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
" Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961).
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trator of an estate must base his claim upon the Massachusetts
wrongful death act.'" The court held that under New York law
recovery for wrongful death could be granted only in tort and that
the New York wrongful death act" has no extraterritorial applica-
tion." However, the New York court further stated that in future
actions it would refuse to apply the 15,000 dollar limitation con-
tained in the Massachusetts statute"' because such provision was con-
trary to the public policy of the forum, 7 as expressed in the New
York Constitution.' Moreover, the New York court, with respect
to its conflict-of-laws rule, characterized the measure of damages in
a wrongful death action as procedural in nature;" therefore, in
future actions of this type based on a foreign statute, New York
courts would apply New York's compensatory standard instead of
those standards prevailing in other jurisdictions inconsistent there-
with, such as the punitive standard of Massachusetts."0 The court of
"Id. at 529. Although the plaintiff in Kilberg was in effect advised to amend his cause
of action to conform with the court's decree, he declined to do so and instead discontinued
his action. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131, 132 n.3 (2d Cir. 1962).
24N.Y. Deced. Est. Law §§ 130-34 (1949). Consistent with the state constitution,
see note 4 supra, New York's wrongful death act provides that damages are to be awarded
without any limitation as "fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injuries, resulting
from the decedent's death, to the person or persons, for whose benefit the action is brought."
Id. at § 132. Compare the provisions of the Massachusetts wrongful death statute, note
2 supra, with the New York statute.
25 See note 51 infra.
26 See note 2 supra. At present, a general policy of limiting recovery of damages in a
wrongful death action is expressed in the statutes of thirteen states. Colorado: Col. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 41-1-3 (Supp. 1960) ($25,000); Illinois: Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 70, § 2
(Smith-Hurd 1959) ($30,000); Kansas: Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 60-3203 (Supp. 1961)
($25,000); Maine: Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 165, § 10 (Supp. 1961) ($30,000 plus
reasonable expenses incurred for medical treatment, hospitalization, and burial of decedent);
Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 229, § 2 (Supp. 1962) ($30,000); Minnesota:
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 573.02 (Supp. 1962) ($25,000); Missouri: Mo. Ann. Stat. § 537.090
(Supp. 1962) ($25,000); New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 556:13 (Supp. 1961)
($10,000, but $25,000 if decedent is survived by parent, spouse, or minor child); Oregon:
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 30.020 (1961) ($25,000); South Dakota: S.D. Sess. Laws 1963, ch.
235, § 37.2203 ($30,000); Virginia: Va. Code Ann. 5 8-636 (Supp. 1962) ($35,000);
West Virginia: W. Va. Code Ann. § 5475 (1961) ($25,000); Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. Ann.
§331.04 (Supp. 1963) ($22,500 plus maximum of $3,000 for loss of companionship and ad-
ditional maximum of $10,000 if decedent leaves minor children). In two other states,
damages are limited only in certain prescribed instances. Indiana: Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-404
(Supp. 1962) (cases in which decedent leaves no surviving parent, spouse, children, or next
of kin); South Carolina: S.C. Code §§ 14-401, 33-229, 33-926 (1962) (certain specified
situations in which wrongful death action is prosecuted against governmental body).
2'Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 528 (1961).
" See note 4 supra.
"Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 529 (1961). The
forum itself normally determines in accordance with its own conflict-of-laws doctrine
whether a given rule of law is procedural or substantive. Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 10,
at § 81; Leflar, op. cit. supra note 10, at 5§ 58-60; Restatement, op. cit. supra note 9, at
S 384. Although the forum may exercise considerable discretion for this purpose, a clearly
outrageous characterization constitutes a denial of full faith and credit and a violation of
due process. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
"Under the Massachusetts wrongful death act, the carrier "shall be liable in dam-
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appeals in the instant case relied heavily upon these statements of
the New York court in the Kilberg case.3
In the instant case, the analysis of the majority3" centered upon
New York's substantial connections with the cause of action and
that state's interest in its outcome."3 The majority first ascertained
ages . . . to be assessed with reference to the degree of culpability of the defendant or of
his . . .servants or agents. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 229, § 2 (1955). (Emphasis
added.)
31 There is a disagreement whether those statements in Kilberg which were controlling in
the instant case constitute dictum or a holding. One federal court has referred to that
part of the Kilberg opinion dealing with the Massachusetts wrongful death statute as
"sweeping dictum." St. Clair v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 623, 624 (S.D.N.Y.
1961). Several writers have reached the same conclusion: Keeffe, Piercing Pearson, 29 J.
Air L. & Com. 95 (1963); Comment, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 723 (1961); Note, 25 Albany L.
Rev. 313 (1961); Note, 30 U. Cin. L. Rev. 511 (1961); Note, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 271
(1961). However, others have arrived at the opposite conclusion: Comment, 61 Colum. L.
Rev. 1497 (1961); Note, 27 Brooklyn L. Rev. 336 (1961); Note, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 187
(1961). Indeed, even in the instant case, the opinions of the trial court, Pearson v. North-
east Airlines, Inc., 201 F. Supp. at 46, 199 F. Supp. at 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), and the panel
majority opinion, 307 F.2d 131, 132-36, dismiss the relevant parts of the Kilberg decision
as dictum. But the panel dissent, 307 F.2d at 136-47, the en banc dissent, 309 F.2d at
564-69, and the en banc majority opinion, 309 F.2d at 555-64, regard these statements as a
rule or holding. The precise issue before the New York court in the Kilberg case was
whether, under circumstances identical to those of the instant case, recovery could be had
under New York law on the theory of a breach by the defendant of an implied contract
for the safe carriage of plaintiff's decedent to his destination. After summarily resolving that
question in the negative, the New York court, over the protests of three of its members,
proceeded to reach further conclusions which the court in the instant case accepted as the
established law of New York.
In any event, the proper technical classification of the pertinent statements in the
Kilberg case is of little practical significance in the instant case. If the law of a state is not
settled, a federal court, if necessary for the adjudication of a claim before it, must attempt
to forecast what rule that state would adopt under identical circumstances. See, e.g.,
Hartness v. Aldens, Inc., 301 F.2d 228, 229 (7th Cir. 1962); Hablas v. Armour & Co.,
270 F.2d 71, 75-76 (8th Cir. 1959); Yost v. Morrow, 262 F.2d 826, 828 (9th Cir. 1959).
Therefore, even assuming that the statements of the New York Court of Appeals in Kilberg
constituted dictum, the court's reliance thereon in the the instant case would seem to have
been justified on the ground that the Kilberg decision imparted the element of uncertainty
to New York's conflict-of-laws rule with respect to wrongful death actions.
32 Fundamentally, the four opinions (i.e., panel majority, panel dissent, en banc ma-
jority, and en banc dissent) rendered by the court of appeals in the instant case present only
two sharply conflicting analyses of the issue at hand. Judge Kaufman, who wrote the ma-
jority opinion for the court en banc, dissented from the judgment of the panel, Pearson v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131, 136-47 (2d Cir. 1962); his dissenting opinion was
adopted as a part of the en banc majority opinion, 309 F.2d at 556. Similarly, the reasoning
of Judge Swan's panel majority opinion does not differ significantly from that of the
en banc dissenting opinion written by Judge Friendly.
" The method of analysis followed by the majority has the support of eminent au-
thorities. See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 173
(1933); Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 Yale L.J. 457
(1924); Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict of
Laws, 10 Stan. L. Rev. 205 (1958); Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law:
Governmental Interests and the judicial Function, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 9 (1958); Ehrenz-
weig, The Lex Fori - Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 637 (1960);
Freund, Chief justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1210 (1946);
Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Texas L. Rev. 657 (1959). See also Re.
statement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
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the true character of the New York conflict-of-laws rule" as ex-
pressed in the Kilberg case.' The court then proceeded to justify
the application of the Kilberg rule in terms of New York's "sub-
stantial ties" with the cause of action,"' which gave that state a
legitimate and substantial interest in its outcome."' In so doing, it
emphasized that it was not concerned with the wisdom of the New
York rule and that its sole concern was with the power of a state to
declare such a rule."8 Thereafter, the New York conflict-of-laws
rule, as applied, was upheld against contentions of its unconstitu-
tionality. Regarding the requirement of full faith and credit, the
court noted that although the Massachusetts statute "should be
honored fully and completely when the incident under litigation is
a local one, " " a state has no "constitutionally protected claim to the
unqualified application of its statute in cases with an overwhelming
interstate flavor."4 In response to the due process argument, the
court merely observed that defendant could not be deprived of any
property because it had no vested right in the application of the
Massachusetts limitation on damages.4' The approach of the dissent
was grounded in the traditional procedure-substance dichotomy."
Although conceding that the cause of action constitutionally could
have been based entirely upon the substantive law of New York,
the dissent nevertheless concluded that the full faith and credit
clause required the application of the Massachusetts statute in its
"In effect, the Court of Appeals . . . of New York, in Kilberg, fashioned a rule of
law allowing recovery of damages without arbitrary limit, modeled on the New York
Wrongful Death Statute, although the Massachusetts statute still served as the foundation for
plaintiff's cause of action for wrongful death." Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309
F.2d 553, 556-57 (2d Cir. 1962).
3' The en banc opinions regarded the applicable statements in Kilberg as a holding and
accepted the case as the law of New York, unlike Judge Swan, who, in his panel opinion,
considered those statements as dictum and consequently rejected them. See note 31 supra.
a' New York's connections with the cause of action were by no means tenuous. First,
plaintiff and plaintiff's decedent were citizens of New York. Second, plaintiff's decedent
purchased his airplane ticket in New York and also boarded defendant's airplane in that state.
Third, most of the ill-fated flight was conducted over New York. Fourth, defendant was
lawfully doing business in the forum state, was promoting actively its business there with
New York citizens, and generally was conducting extensive operations in that state. Fifth,
as decedent's surviving wife, plaintiff conceivably could become a public charge of New
York. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing en banc, p. 7; see also Pearson v. Northeast Airlines,
Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 557 (2d Cir. 1962).
3 See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
"Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 562, 307 F.2d 141 n.12 (2d Cir.
1962).
39309 F.2d at 561.
40 Ibid.
4' 309 F.2d 553, 561-62, 307 F.2d 131, 140-42; cf. note 46 infra.
4'The dissent utilized the traditional, so-called "mechanical" method of analysis ad-
vanced by the Restatement and other less recent authorities. See notes 10, 11 supra; cf.
Currie, op. cit. supra, note 33.
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entirety or else not at all, so as not to interfere "with the proper
freedom of action of the legislature of the sister state." Alter-
natively, the dissent reasoned that the standard for the measure of
damages embodied in the Massachusetts statute and the limitation
on recovery contained therein were in fact matters of substance,
and, therefore, that the Constitution dictated their recognition by
the law of New York." In so concluding, the dissenting judges
apparently assumed that the Massachusetts legislature had a vested
right in the application of all parts of its statute deemed "substan-
tive."45 In brief, the dissent merely presented the orthodox, traditional
argument that the Constitution should require the complete applica-
tion of the lex loci delicti after its recognition by the forum as the
source of the claim."
The instant case strongly advances the modern proposition that
a state constitutionally may develop and then apply its conflict-of-
laws doctrine to those incidents of litigation in which it has a
legitimate and substantial interest, without regard to the geo-
graphical origin of the cause of action. Prior to the instant case, it
had been well established that statutory defenses of the forum may
qualify or limit a cause of action based on the lex loci delicti7 and
that the forum may attach reasonable conditions to the enforcement
of a contract made or to be performed in another jurisdiction."'
However, although the Massachusetts statute was looked to for the
source of the claim in the instant case, such integral provisions as
its 15,000 dollar limitation on recovery and its punitive standard
for the measure of damages were wholly ignored. In form, recovery
was allowed under the law of Massachusetts, but in fact, New York
4aPearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1962).
"Id. at 567-69; see notes 11, 29 supra.
" Although recognizing that considerable latitude is afforded the forum in characterizing
various aspects of a cause of action as either procedural or substantive, the dissenting judges
asserted that the limits of this permissible discretion had been greatly exceeded by the New
York court in Kilberg: "[T]he transformation of a penal and limited statutory liability into
a compensatory and unlimited one goes far beyond the widest concept of 'procedure' or
'remedy'." Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 568 (2d Cir. 1962). Thus,
they concluded, since "merely labeling a difference from the foreign law as 'procedural' or
'remedial' rather than substantive will not defeat application of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause," (John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936)) the char-
acterization made in Kilberg was clearly violative of the Constitution and should not be fol-
lowed in the instant case. Ibid. See note 29 supra.
"Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131, 133-36 (2d Cir. 1962); cf. supra at
139-40 and 309 F.2d at 557. In essence, it would seem that the dissenting opinion reflects
a partial adherence to the archaic "vested rights" theory of the conflict of laws based on
the notion of territorial sovereignty. See Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120
(1904); Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451 (1904).
47 See note 20 supra.
40 See note 21 supra.
[Vol. 17
law was controlling in all essential respects. Few courts, if any, have
gone so far." Of course, to promote clarity and simplicity in the
operation of a modern theory of the conflict of laws, the entire
cause of action in the instant case should have been governed by
New York law,' i.e., recovery should have been granted either
through an extraterritorial application of the New York wrongful
death act or upon the theory of a breach of an implied contract for
the safe carriage of plaintiff's decedent. However, neither cause of
action could have been maintained successfully under existing New
York law,"1 which the court in the instant case was constrained to
follow." Therefore, it is submitted that under the circumstances of
the instant case,"5 necessity dictated the nominal application of the
Massachusetts wrongful death statute in order to effect a just result.
In many conflict-of-laws situations such as the instant one, two
competing legal interests emerge. Each possesses the highest legal
attributes, and ideally a balance giving them equal weight should be
struck, but as a practical matter that is impossible. On the one hand
is the necessity of promoting stability, certainty, and uniformity in
the law of a federal system. On the other hand is the objective of
rendering complete justice to the respective litigants by adjudicating
the controversy between them on all of its merits. In applying the
lex loci delicti to remove this basic antagonism, the method of the
Restatement amply advances the former consideration of certainty
and stability in the law, sometimes at great expense to the latter
objective because the actual merits of a claim can never be fully
considered by a choice-of-law rule based on the purely fortuitous
location of the place of injury. Conversely, fundamental fairness to
"9Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Schmidt v. Driscoll
Hotel, 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957); Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7
Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
o That the law of New York constitutionally could have governed the entire cause of
action is expressly conceded by the dissenting opinion. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
309 F.2d 553, 564-66 (2d Cir. 1962). The majority opinion is impliedly in agreement with
this proposition. id. at 557-58.
51 As to the exclusively local application of the New York wrongful death act, see
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 42-43, 172 N.E.2d 529, 537-38 (1961);
Royal Indem. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 272 App. Div. 246, 250-51, 70 N.Y.S.2d
697, 700-01 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 619, 75 N.E.2d 631 (1947); Baldwin v.
Powell, 294 N.Y. 130, 132, 61 N.E.2d 412, 413 (1945). As to the unavailability of an
action ex contractu, see Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d at 531, 535-36;
Leonard v. Columbia Steam Nay. Co., 84 N.Y. 48, 53 (1881); Crowly v. Panama R.R.,
30 Barb. 99 (N.Y. 1859).
2See notes 15, 16 supra.
"' As a practical matter, the arbitrary Massachusetts limitation on recovery for wrongful
death was, in effect, merely a legislatively created immunity operating in favor of common
carriers to restrict their liability for negligently caused death. That $15,000 is a highly
unreasonable limitation on recovery for wrongful death is too obvious for argument.
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the respective litigants is enhanced by the alternative method fol-
lowed in the instant case, i.e., applying the law of the state which
has the most substantial contacts with and interest in the outcome
of the litigation. To be sure, under this approach certainty and
stability in the conflict of laws may be derogated, particularly if
the instant case actually holds that "a single 'transaction' may con-
tain within itself several distinct 'issues' legitimately made subject
to the law of more than one state.'" Moreover, the ideal of uni-
formity is jeopardized by the theory which the instant decision ad-
vances to the extent that it encourages forum shopping. Also, what
in law constitutes a sufficiently substantial interest apparently can
only be determined on a case by case basis. However, the price of
progress is not always trivial, and progress in the underdeveloped
area of the conflict of laws must necessarily be defined to include
a consideration of factors more significant than the mere location
of the place of injury in the choice of applicable law. For this reason,
the instant case's belated giving of constitutional freedom to states
to develop their own respective conflict-of-laws doctrines must be
preferred over the mechanical method embodied in the Restatement.
Moreover, if the "substantial connections and legitimate interest"
theory were to be widely accepted and applied, perhaps the cherished
elements of certainty and predictability-if they were to be lost
temporarily-would be restored in time to the conflict of laws.
Wallace M. Swanson
" Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 560 (2d Cir. 1962).
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